We describe a verification method for cryptographic protocols, based on first-order invariants. For typical protocols, a suitable invariant can be generated mechanically from the program text, allowing safety properties to be proved by ordinary first-order reasoning.
Roadmap
We model protocols as transition systems, where the state of the system is given by the set of transitions that have been executed and the set of messages that have been published (i.e., sent in the clear). A typical transition generates some fresh values (to be used as nonces or keys), checks that some precondition holds, records that the transition has taken place, and publishes a new message. Several implicit transitions model the actions of the spy, and the states of the system can be further restricted by user-supplied axioms.
From the protocol description, we generate a number of invariants. All but one of these is invariant by construction. The one exception is the secrecy invariant, which says that if a message is published, then either we know something interesting about the states of some principals, or the message is a tuple or encryption whose components are also published 5 . Safety properties like authentication are proved from the invariants using ordinary first-order reasoning.
To show the invariance of the secrecy invariant, we have to show that it is closed under the destructors; proving this usually requires substantial reasoning about message authentication. Fortunately, we have all of the invariants to work with (including the secrecy invariant), so these proofs are rather easy. If one of these proofs fails, it suggests the last step of an attack through which illicit information can leak out to the spy. (It does not, however, guarantee the existence of such an attack.)
In TAPS, all of this logical reasoning is performed by a resolution theorem prover 6 ; For most protocols, TAPS generates a suitable secrecy invariant without any help, but for some protocols, the user has to provide hints (typically a formula proposing conditions necessary for the publication of a particular nonce, key, or nested encryption) 7 . We illustrate the method with what has become the standard example, the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe (NSL) protocol [14] , for which the complete TAPS input appears in figure 1. Because we want to show both how the method can be applied by hand and how it is used within TAPS, we present a complete hand proof, but describe TAPS only down to the level of first-order proof obligations. (To make the proof easier to follow, and to illustrate some additional features, figure 1 includes some axioms and hints that TAPS doesn't actually need.) Additional examples of TAPS input appear in the appendix.
Protocol NeedhamSchroederLowe /* k(X) represents X's public key, but the protocol below works for any type of key */ Definitions { m0 = {A,Na}_k(B) m1 = {B,Na,Nb}_k(A) m2 = {Nb}_k(B) } Transitions { /* A->B */ Na: pub(A) /\ pub(B) -p0-> m0 /* B->A */ Nb: pub(B) /\ pub(m0) -p1-> m1 /* A->B */ p0 /\ pub(m1) -p2-> m2 /* B */ p1 /\ pub(m2) -p3-> {} /* A */ p0 /\ dk(k(A)) -oopsNa-> Na /* B */ p1 /\ dk(k(B)) -oopsNb-> Nb } Axioms { /* Not necessary -honest principals can safely share keys */ k injective } Labels { /* Hints used to generate the secrecy invariant (illustration only -TAPS generates better ones automatically) the spy sees Na/Nb only if A or B is compromised */ Na, Nb: dk(k(A)) \/ dk(k(B)) } Goals { /* if A has executed p2, then B has executed p1 with the same values for A,B,Na,Nb, or one of their private keys has been compromised */ p2 => p1 \/ dk(k(A)) \/ dk(k(B)) /* if B has executed p3, then A has executed p2 with the same values for A,B,Na,Nb, or one of their private keys has been compromised */ p3 => p2 \/ dk(k(A)) \/ dk(k(B)) } 
Messages
Each protocol makes use of an underlying set of messages whose structure is given by a first-order theory 8 . Identifiers starting with uppercase letters (X,Y ,Na,. . . ) are first-order variables, ranging over messages; in displayed formulas, all such variables are implicitly universally quantified. Identifiers starting with lowercase letters (nil , pub, p0,. . . ) are first-order functions, first-order predicates, and state predicates (section 2.2). The message theory includes the following predicate and function symbols (individual protocols may use additional predicate and function symbols):
iff X is an atomic message (e.g., a nonce or a key)
iff messages encrypted under X can be decrypted using Y
The first-order theory says that nil , cons, and enc are injective, with disjoint ranges, and do not yield atoms . The user can provide additional axioms in the Axioms section.
example: The NSL protocol makes use of the additional function k, mapping names of principals to their public keys. The injectivity of k means that principals do not share public keys 9 . end of example TAPS allows the standard comma-separated list notation for right-associated tuples; for example, {X,Y,z} abbreviates cons(X, cons(Y, cons(z, nil ))). TAPS uses the binary infix operator _ as a synonym for enc (with arguments reversed), so {A,B}_X abbreviates enc(X, cons(A, cons(B, nil ))). To make protocols easier to read and modify, TAPS allows the user to define abbreviations for message terms (in the Definitions section).
example (continued):
The Definitions section of the NSL protocol introduces the definition m0 = enc(k(B), cons(A, cons(Na, nil ))) end of example 8 We do not assume an induction principle for message destructors, so for example there is nothing to prevent the message theory from having a fixed point for encryption. 9 Using the built-in declarations for injective functions and hash functions lets TAPS do a better job of simplifying lemmas and proof obligations, leading to more efficient verification.
States
We model protocols as transition systems, where the state of the system is given by the interpretations of a (protocol-specific) collection of state predicates. (Recall that in standard model theory, the interpretation of a predicate is a set of tuples, so a state predicate can also be viewed as an ordinary program variable ranging over sets of message tuples.) Each protocol makes use of the special state predicate pub; pub(X) means that the message X has been published (sent in the clear). The remaining state predicates are history predicates that track which transitions have been executed. For each history predicate p, TAPS generates a signature Σ p (a list of distinct variables), as described in section 2.3.1; in formulas, p abbreviates the formula p(Σ p ). TAPS does not allow history predicates to appear with explicit arguments (although argument substitution can be achieved using the import notation of section 3); this prevents users from writing formulas whose meaning depends on the ordering of variables within a signature. This discipline makes it much easier to read and modify large protocols (whose state predicates might contain a dozen or more arguments).
example (continued):
In the NSL protocol, p0 is a history predicate, with signature Σ p0 = A, B, Na. Thus, the guard of the third transition, p0∧pub(m1), is syntactic sugar for the formula p0(A, B, Na) ∧ pub(m1). end of example TAPS also defines
dk is, in effect, a state predicate (except that it can't be assigned to); dk (X) means that messages encrypted under X are decryptable by the spy.
Various flavors of keys can be defined using the predicate d, but weaker specifications in terms of dk are strong enough for all practical purposes. For example, the predicate sk(X) ("X is a symmetric key") could be defined with the axiom
but we prefer the weaker axiom
Explicit axioms for keys are usually needed only for protocols that dynamically generate such keys (for example, the protocols in the appendix); simple protocols like NSL can be written in a form that is independent of the kind of encryption used (e.g., by writing goals using dk instead of pub).
A formula without free (message) variables is said to be stable if, once true, it is guaranteed to remain true thereafter. (A formula with free variables is stable iff each of its instances is stable.) All state predicates are stable (messages, once published, remain published; transitions, once executed, remain executed). A formula is positive if no state predicate occurs with negative polarity (i.e., guarded by an odd number of negations); a simple inductive argument shows that positive formulas are also stable.
Protocols
The behavior of a protocol is given by a set of actions, each of the form
where guard is a formula, p is a state predicate, and args is a list of terms. This action is executed as follows:
1. choose arbitrary message values for the free variables of guard and args;
2. check that guard holds in the current state; 3. modify the state by adding the tuple args to the interpretation of p;
4. check that all user-supplied axioms hold.
A protocol is executed by starting from a state where all state predicates are false and all user-supplied axioms hold, and executing an arbitrary sequence of actions.
Transitions
Protocol actions are not given directly; instead, the user provides a set of transitions, labeled with distinct history predicates. The transition labeled p has the form
where nv p is a list of distinct variables (the nonce variables of p), g p is a positive formula, and M p is a message term. For convenience, we will assume that the nv p 's are disjoint, although this restriction is not essential. TAPS treats any predicate symbol that appears as the label of a transition as a history predicate, and assumes the remaining predicate symbols are ordinary first-order predicates of the underlying message theory. Then, for each history predicate p, TAPS chooses a minimal signature Σ p that includes all free variables of nv p , g p and M p ; this restriction determines the signatures uniquely, up to variable reordering 11 . The transition above is syntactic sugar for the two actions
where fresh(nv p ) means that the values assigned to the variables of nv p are distinct atoms that have not been previously chosen as instantiations for nonce variables of state predicates 12 ; formally,
(This effect is approximated in real protocols by choosing fresh atoms randomly from a large pool of candidates.) example (continued): Here are the transitions of the NSL protocol:
From these transitions, TAPS generates the signatures
The first transition translates to the (desugared) actions
The first of these actions is executed by choosing arbitrary values for A, B, and Na, checking that A and B are published (a common, weak way to test values as being suitable for use as names of principals) and that Na is a fresh atom, adding the tuple A, B, Na to the interpretation of p0, and finally checking that all of the user-defined axioms hold. (The NSL axioms don't mention any state predicates, so the last check is unnecessary.) end of example
In addition to the transitions explicitly given, each protocol implicitly includes actions modeling the capabilities of the spy. These include the transition
Note that nothing prevents a transition from making use of an atom that has not yet been issued as a nonce value; typically, this will prevent verification of the secrecy invariant.
(the spy can generate new atoms) and the actions
(the spy can tuple, encrypt, and untuple previously published messages, and decrypt messages encrypted with decryptable keys). Note that in each case, the spy publishes the result, allowing these actions to be chained together.
Imports
To motivate our last bit of notational machinery, consider a transition system with the single action
where g is positive (hence stable) and t is a term. Suppose we arrive in a state where pub(m) holds, for some value m. If m has no free variables, we can conclude
where V is a superset of the variables occurring free in g or t. Intuitively, this is because pub(m) must have been truthified by the action above (it's the only one); the execution that truthified it must have chosen variable bindings for which t = m; g must have held just before the action was executed (for the chosen bindings), and must hold now (because g is stable). In the general case where m might contain free variables, we have to rename variables of g and t to avoid capturing free variables of m in the scope of the existential quantification, so we write instead
where g is g with each variable primed (similarly for t ). It is helpful to think of this formula as specifying a new context (the one given by the values of the primed variables), related to the surrounding context by the constraint t = m.
(In general, we may have several such constraints.) Since the list of variables V and the primed symbols are really not carrying any information other than separating the constraints from the new context, we abbreviate this formula with the new notation
In general, let V be the set of all free variables in the formula f or in any of the terms Y i , let V be V with all variables primed, and let f be f with all variables primed. We define
In hand proofs, we work directly with imports using the following rules (here, h is injective and fv.f is the set of free variables in f):
TAPS uses imports internally only to facilitate communication with the user; it replaces imports with existential quantification before doing any deduction.
Invariants
For each protocol, TAPS generates several invariants:
• guard lemmas say that history predicates imply their guards;
• unicity lemmas say that nonce values are not reused 13 ;
• the secrecy invariant classifies the messages that the protocol can publish, and what conditions are implied by each.
The guard and unicity lemmas are generated in such a way that their invariance is guaranteed without further justification. However, the secrecy invariant is conjectural, and its invariance depends on discharging a number of proof obligations.
Guard Lemmas
For each history variable p (other than trash), TAPS generates the invariant
Intuitively, this is an invariant because the implicant holds before p is first truthified, and the implicant is positive (hence stable).
example (continued): NSL generates the following guard lemmas:
end of example
Unicity Lemmas
Unicity lemmas come in two flavors. The first unicity lemma says that for variable assignments satisfying a given state predicate, the value assigned to any nonce variable of the predicate uniquely determines the other variables in the signature of the predicate (because nonce variables are not reused). Formally,
TAPS actually uses the following (equivalent) formulation, which is more efficient for most theorem provers:
where f v,w is a new Skolem function.
For hand proofs, we want to avoid explicit arguments to state predicates, so we use instead the following schema: for any formula f,
This captures the way we use unicity in hand proofs -to widen the scope of an import.
The second unicity lemma says that the same nonce value cannot be assigned to two different nonce variables: for distinct nonce variables v ∈ nv p and w ∈ nv q ,
TAPS does not generate explicit unicity lemmas involving the spy-generated atoms (Trash), because they are not needed for useful protocol properties. These lemmas are, however, needed to prove the soundness of the nonce lemmas below.
example (continued): NSL generates the following unicity lemmas:
For hand proofs, we have instead the lemma schemas
The Secrecy Invariant
We would like to prove an invariant inv given by a definition of the form
where ok is a stable, unary predicate 14 Intuitively, ok is our way of describing the constraints we put on the set of published messages; we will use a hypothetical proof of the invariance of inv to generate a suitable definition of ok . (Similarly, we will use the predicates prime and primeAt below before giving their definitions.)
To show that inv is an invariant, we must show that it holds initially and that it is stable. inv holds initially because pub is initially false. To show the stability of inv , we need to show that it is preserved by every action of the protocol. Because ok is stable, inv is preserved by actions that do not update pub, so we need only consider actions of the form g −→ pub(M); to show that such an action preserves inv , it suffices to prove the proof obligation inv ∧ g ⇒ ok(M) (again, because ok(M) is stable). Each of the proof obligations assumes inv , and their collective proofs implies the invariance of inv , so we simply assume inv throughout, keeping in mind that anything we prove along the way is meaningless unless all of the proof obligations are discharged.
Expanding out the proof obligations for all of the relevant program actions gives us the following set of formulas to prove:
We satisfy (2-5) as follows. Let prime be a stable unary predicate (defined below), and define
(2)-(4) then follow immediately. Since
Similarly, the obligation (6) follows from
We are thus left with the obligations (1), (7), and (8).
The obligations (1) are each of the form f ⇒ ok (X). Although there is no induction principle for messages, there is an induction principle for terms, so we repeatedly replace these obligations with simpler ones based on the structure of X:
• drop obligations of the form f ⇒ ok (nil );
• replace the obligation f ⇒ ok (cons(Y, Z)) with the obligations f ⇒ prime(cons(Y, Z)), f ⇒ ok (Y) and f ⇒ ok (Z);
• replace the obligation f ⇒ ok (enc(Y, Z)) with the obligations
The soundness of each of these rules follows from the definition of ok .
example (continued):
To illustrate this procedure, consider the first transition of the NSL protocol. The corresponding obligation (1) is
Since m0 is defined as enc(k(B), cons(A, cons(Na, nil ))), this obligation is replaced with the obligations
The first of these obligations, in turn, is replaced with
end of example
This procedure leaves us with obligations of the forms
• g j ⇒ prime(enc(Y j , Z j )); and
, where Z k is not an application of nil ,cons, or enc.
We satisfy obligations of the first two types by defining
where primeAt is a stable unary predicate such that primeAt(X) ⇒ atom(X). Because we already introduced the obligations f ⇒ ok(Y i ) and f ⇒ ok(Z i ) for each proof obligation of the form f i ⇒ prime(cons(Y i , Z i )), this definition of prime satisfies (7). Because we already introduced the obligation f ∧ dk (Y i ) ⇒ ok (Z i ) for each proof obligation of the form f i ⇒ prime(enc(Y i , Z i )), this definition of prime satisfies (8) .
The proof obligations of the third type are delegated to the resolution theorem prover. To discharge these, we need to generate a suitable definition of primeAt. TAPS defines it as
where L v (the label of v) is a formula giving conditions under which an atom generated as v might be published.
Because these conditions might be arbitrarily complex, TAPS allows the user to specify L v in the Labels section; if absent, TAPS chooses
where k ranges over the obligations of the third type and ≡ is syntactic identity. This choice of L v is heuristic and fragile (it generates different invariants for protocols that are equivalent modulo renaming of variables in a transition), but it has proved very effective in practice. This heuristic leverages information implicit in the choice of variable names used in a protocol: if one protocol transition generates a fresh value, and another transition publishes a message with a component using the same name, then by stripping off encryption surrounding the published component, an adversary should only be able to get information about the generated value. The best defense of this heuristic is that it chooses correct nonce labels for all of the examples we have tried (i.e., it allowed us to simply remove existing nonce labels without further modification to the protocols).
example (continued):
In NSL (figure 1), we explicitly gave labels for the two nonce types:
Intuitively, this says that the nonces should only be published only if the private key of one of the two participating principals has been compromised. This annotation generates the definitions
and the proof obligations:
Had the labels not been given explicitly, TAPS would have defined
Consequences of the secrecy invariant
Instead of working with inv directly, TAPS uses the following corollaries:
The first four corollaries are jointly referred to as message lemmas, and corollaries of the last type are called nonce lemmas. To see that the nonce lemmas are sound, for v ∈ nv p ,
example (continued): Using these corollaries, we rewrite pub(m0) as follows:
By similar reasoning,
NSL also generates the nonce lemmas
We can then discharge the proof obligations for NSL as follows: Thus, we would have only the weaker
As a result, it is no longer possible to prove the proof obligation
which says that the third protocol message does not release inappropriate information (i.e., a message that is not ok ) if the recipient is compromised. This is just what happens in Lowe's man-in-the-middle attack [14] -the last message sent by an honest initiator of a session with a compromised responder can leak to the spy the value of a nonce generated by an uncompromised responder, even though neither the uncompromised responder nor the principal he believes to be his initiator are compromised. end of example
Proving authentication properties
Finally, the guard, unicity, message, and nonce lemmas are used to prove any desired authentication properties (given in the Goals section).
example (continued):
Here are proofs of the authentication properties for the NSL protocol. The first theorem says that, if A completes his final step, then either A or B is compromised, or B has completed his first step, with the same values for A,B,Na and Nb:
The second theorem says that, if B completes his final step, then either A or B is compromised, or A has completed his final step, with the same values for A,B,Na and Nb:
Output Annotations
There is an important case where the secrecy invariant generated by the procedure above is too strong (and TAPS is unable to discharge the resulting proof obligations). The problem arises when one protocol step publishes a nested encryption, and another protocol step strips off the outer encryption and publishes the inner encryption without looking at its structure 16 . The best-known protocols that do this kind of "blind stripping" are the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol and various flavors of Kerberos.
example: Consider the following (artificial) protocol, where m0 = enc(Na, nil ):
TAPS generates the following definition of primeEnc:
However, this invariant is too strong (it isn't an invariant), and TAPS fails to prove the proof obligation p1 ⇒ ok (Y ). To get a satisfactory invariant, the second disjunct above has to be weakened to
end of example
To cater to such protocols, we allow the user to guide the construction of the secrecy invariant by labeling subterms of outputs of protocol steps with positive formulas. The label is written in square brackets; the formula associated with this label is given in the Labels section. Intuitively, the formula gives conditions that necessarily hold if the surrounding encryption is ever stripped away, revealing a previously unpublished message. We add a new rule for breaking up a proof obligation of the form f ⇒ ok (X):
, where L S is the formula associated with the label S.
example (continued):
To generate an appropriate secrecy invariant for the protocol shown above, we decorate the first transition with the label S Na : true
The modified proof obligation rules allow TAPS to generate the appropriate definition of prime.
end of example
For a more realistic example where explicit annotation is necessary, see the Needham-Schroeder shared key protocol (figure 3 in the appendix), which uses explicit annotation on the subterm m0 published in step p1. In practically all cases, the hints are of precisely the form illustrated in the example above. The generation of these hints could be further automated by introducing notation that makes explicit the correspondence between the variable bindings in actions that send and receive messages. (For example, both the Casper [15] and CAPSL [19] languages provide such notations.)
Transition Labels and Recursive Protocols
Recall that we required the guard of a transition to be positive, in order to guarantee that the guard is stable. TAPS actually allows arbitrary formulas as guards, and allows the user to provide a positive formula L(p) to use in place of g p the guard lemma. (The user provides this formula in the Labels section). The guard lemma then becomes
and TAPS has to prove the additional proof obligation
We originally intended these labels to be used in protocols like Woo-Lam, where a principal has to check that incoming nonce challenges do not collide with nonce challenges previously sent out; such a test introduces a negation in the guard. However, it is just as easy (if slightly less honest) to simply rule out such collisions using an axiom. In practice, the critical application of transition labels is in verifying recursive protocols. The procedure is similar to Floyd's method for sequential program verification: we choose a set of "cut" transitions, such that every transition loop is in the cut, and for each cut transition, we add the necessary inductive hypotheses as an explicit label.
example: Consider the protocol consisting of the single transition
Defining L(p) = false in the Labels section introduces a new assumption p ⇒ false and a new proof obligation p ⇒ false, which is trivially discharged from the assumption. The conclusion is that ¬p holds in all states.
end of example
This approach to recursive protocols is somewhat weaker than what one would wish; there are no recursive functions, and the labels have to be positive. Thus, we can model chains of various sorts, but we have no good way to state conditions such as "X's value is good or one of X's ancestors is compromised". In order to cope with such assertions, we are considering extending the input language to allow users to axiomatize new state predicates.
Experimental Results
We used TAPS to analyze all but three of the authentication protocols in the Clark & Jacob survey [8] (we did not analyze Diffie-Hellman key exchange (which depends explicitly on exponentiation), Shamir-Rivest-Adelman Threepass (which uses commutative encryption), or the Gong mutual authentication (which uses XOR)). Such a statement has to be taken with a grain of salt, since the meaning of "verification" depends on how protocols are modeled and what properties are being verified. (For example, TAPS has no built-in notion of "injective authentication", and Casper tests mostly make strong type assumptions, so our results and those obtained using Casper [9] are not completely comparable.) We formalized each of these protocols and tried to prove what we expected the protocols could reasonably achieve. For protocols with known bugs (or bugs that we discovered accidentally), we weakened the specification appropriately and/or fixed the protocol (typically by adding type information to prevent obvious message confusion attacks). Output annotations were needed only for Kerberos, the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key protocol, and the Amended Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key protocol. In addition, a transition label was needed for each of the Woo-Lam protocols (since, in the absence of additional type checks, they have recursive executions). Verification time averaged about half a second per protocol; the longest verification times were for the ISO four-pass protocol and for Kerberos, each of which required about two and a half seconds.
For each protocol, we were either able to prove the desired properties or find anomalous behaviors that prevented verification. The results were generally in agreement with those reported in [9] , but we did not detailed comparison 17 . The only definite discrepancy we noticed (i.e., an attack on a protocol that was certified by Casper/FDR, Clark/Jacob, and Brackin) is a self-authentication attack on the ISO Four-Pass protocol, which Casper/FDR could have caught but for a mistake in the checking configuration.
We also used TAPS to verify the examples included in the Isabelle distribution. For each protocol, we tried to reproduce faithfully the Isabelle formalizations and tried to prove those safety properties that seemed to be of interest (as opposed to those that seemed of interest only as a step toward proving other results). The major changes were that (1) we eliminated timestamps from BAN Kerberos and Kerberos (but see section 6.1), (2) we rewrote the Bull-Otway recursive protocol to eliminate the recursive server function, and (3) we eliminated the explicit types and typechecking in those protocols where it seemed unnecessary (basically, wherever it was not needed to disambiguate protocol messages). (The Isabelle proofs would probably also go through without these type assumptions.) For protocols admitting reasonable comparison and for which Paulson provided estimated development times (Yahalom, TLS, Needham-Schroeder public key), the TAPS developments required about an order of magnitude less user time to formalize and verify. (Of course this comparison is somewhat unfair, since we had his protocol models to use as guidance.)
Detours
In this section, we describe some features that are not currently part of TAPS.
Timestamps
A previous version of TAPS provided built-in support for timestamps, primarily to reproduce the Isabelle analyses of BAN Kerberos [1] and Kerberos [2] . Typically, one wants to show that with appropriate use of timeouts, the authentication properties of the protocol are robust to the addition of "oops" actions that expose nonces or keys to the spy sufficiently long after their generation.
TAPS used Trash atoms as timestamps; this guaranteed that they were published and did not collide with atoms generated by other transitions. To reason about timestamp ordering, we introduced a linear ordering < and a binary associative, commutative operation + all values, along with the axioms x < x + y x < y ⇔ x + z < y + z (Intuitively, think of each element of the model being mapped to a positive nonstandard real.)
Timestamps were introduced along with transitions, just like nonces. The introduction of a timestamp t for a transition p introduced the following additional proof rules:
• All timestamps are published:
• Timestamps uniquely determine the other values in the signature of their transitions:
For w a nonce or timestamp of q, distinct from t and Trash,
• A timestamp is said to be timely if it is greater than all other issued timestamps. (Note that timeliness is not stable.) If the transition in which a timestamp is declared is given an explicit label, then the timeliness of the timestamp is added as a conjunct to the guard. Note that the ordering on timestamps is based on the order in which they are used as timestamps, not the order in which they are generated, so the spy can freely forge future or past timestamps.
Using this timestamp mechanism, we were able to reproduce the main Isabelle results on BAN Kerberos and Kerberos. We were also able to add timestamp reasoning to protocols from the Clark and Jacob Survey without much difficulty. However, making use of timestamps required introducing new transition labels on every transition where timestamp freshness is important. This was not surprising; like nonce freshness, timestamp freshness is not stable, but unlike nonce freshness, the content of timestamp freshness cannot be eliminated by introducing simple axioms. However, these hints could have been eliminated by using temporal guard lemmas (see below).
The main reasoning for removing timestamp support from TAPS was that timestamp reasoning slowed theorem proving down substantially (typically a factor of about 3-10; in the extreme case of Kerberos, a factor of 20). The degradation is not entirely surprising; it is well known that transitive relations like < can wreak havoc with theorem provers not specially designed to handle them. The problem could be fixed by changing theorem proving strategies, but this is probably not worth the effort.
General Invariants
Currently, TAPS checks stability of a formula by checking that it is positive. This has not seriously hindered the usefulness of TAPS for cryptographic protocols, because the only nonpositive formulas needed in practice are for protocols with branching behavior; we handle these by simply postulating the necessary exclusion as an axiom. (Axioms like this, which mention only the control state of a principal, are not very risky, and letting TAPS deduce their invariance would not significantly enhance its usefulness.) However, we plan to extend TAPS to allow arbitrary formulas in place of positive ones, checking their stability using standard weakest preconditions. This will make TAPS applicable to a wider variety of systems (e.g., systems where cryptography is used to enforce a dynamically changing security policy).
Temporal Guard Lemmas
The guard lemmas that TAPS generates are not as strong as they might be. If a history predicate is true, TAPS concludes that the guard holds, whereas it could reach the stronger conclusion that the guard held at an earlier time when the history predicate was false. This stronger rule would eliminate most of the user-supplied hints needed for recursive protocols and for protocols that use timestamps. For example, applying this to the protocol p p −→ nil TAPS could conclude ¬p without needing a user-supplied transition label. This type of deduction is exploited by several systems, including Athena, Isabelle, and NPA
18
However, this approach has a drawback: it takes us from first-order reasoning to a form of first-order temporal reasoning, which might have a serious impact in performance. (The reasoning is easier than general temporal reasoning, since all the predicates are stable, but it still involves reasoning in multiple contexts.) 
